Detecting malware in mobile applications has become increasingly complex as malware developers turn to advanced techniques to hide or obfuscate malicious components. Alterdroid is a dynamicanalysis tool that compares the behavioral differences between an original app and numerous automatically generated versions of it containing carefully injected modifications.
S martphones have rapidly emerged as popular platforms with increasingly powerful computing, communication, and sensing capabilities. Recent commercial surveys show that smartphones are about to outsell PCs worldwide, and that users are already spending as much time on smartphone applications as on the Web. 1 This has caused a substantial rise in the number of apps available for download in online markets, which in turn has helped create new business models 2 and reshape the way we communicate, socialize, and access services.
Smartphones present numerous security and privacy concerns that in many respects are even more alarming than those in traditional computing environments. 1 Most smartphone platforms are equipped with multiple sensors that can determine the user's location, gestures, locomotion, and other physical activities, as well as cameras and audio-video recorders. Malware residing on the smartphone could leak the sensitive information that these devices capture. Even apparently harmless capabilities have swiftly turned into a potential menace. For example, accelerometer or gyroscope data can be used to infer the location of screen taps and, therefore, what the user is typing, including passwords or message contents. 3 Similarly, the Radio Data System (RDS) embedded in most AM/ FM channels can be exploited to inject attacks on softwaredefined radio (SDR) systems. 4 Most current smartphone platforms are built upon modified versions of desktop operating systems and inherit some of their traditional security features, although they also incorporate more elaborate security models to better fit these devices' architecture and intended use. One remarkable feature is a permission model aimed at restricting an app's ability to access stored data and other available services. Isolation is generally also enforced through sandboxing and other design measures that regulate interapplication communications.
Since a major source of security problems is precisely the ability to incorporate third-party apps from available online markets, security measures at the market level constitute a primary line of defense. Many market operators carry out a revision process over submitted apps that involves some form of security testing. Official details about such revisions remain unknown, but the constant presence of malware in many markets and recent research studies 5 suggest that operators cannot afford to perform an exhaustive analysis over each app submitted for release to the general public. This predicament is further complicated by the fact that determining which apps are malicious and which are not is still a formidable challenge, particularly for so-called grayware-namely, apps that are not fully malicious but that constitute a threat to user security and privacy.
SMARTPHONE MALWARE
The rapid growth of smartphone sales has come hand in hand with a comparable increase in the number and sophistication of malicious software threats to these platforms. For example, according to the mobile threat report published by Juniper Networks in 2012, the number of unique malware variants for Android increased by 3,325 percent during 2011 and by 614 percent between 2012 and 2013. 6 Smartphone malware has become a rather profitable business due to the existence of a large number of potential targets and the availability of reuse-oriented malware development methodologies that make it exceedingly easy to produce new samples.
Malware analysis is a thriving research area with many unsolved problems. 6 In the case of smartphones, the impressive growth in both malware and benign apps is making any human-driven analysis of potentially dangerous apps increasingly unaffordable. This has accelerated the need for smart analysis techniques to aid malware analysts in their daily functions.
Furthermore, smartphone malware is becoming increasingly stealthy, 7 with recent specimens relying on advanced code obfuscation techniques to evade detection by security analysts. 8 For instance, DroidKungFu, Android malware that first appeared in June 2011 and spawned at least six variants, has been mostly distributed through official or alternative markets by piggybacking its malicious payload onto various legitimate apps. Such a payload is encrypted into the app's assets folder and decrypted at runtime using a key placed within a local variable belonging to a specific class module. Another example is GingerMaster, the first malware to use root exploits for privileged escalation on Android 2.3. The main payload is stored as PNG and JPEG images in the asset file, which are then interpreted as code once loaded by a small hook within the app.
More sophisticated obfuscation techniques, particularly for code, are emerging that create an additional obstacle to malware analysts, who must ultimately rely on carefully controlled dynamic analysis to detect potentially dangerous pieces of code.
ALTERDROID: A DIFFERENTIAL FAULT ANALYSIS APPROACH
Alterdroid (www.seg.inf.uc3m.es/~guillermo-suarez-tangil/ Alterdroid) is a tool for detecting obfuscated malware components distributed as parts of an app package. Such components are often hidden outside the app's main code components, as these might be subject to static analysis by market operators. The key idea in Alterdroid consists of analyzing the behavioral differences between the original app and an altered version of it with numerous carefully introduced modifications, or faults. Such modifications are designed to have no observable effect on the app's execution, provided that the altered component is actually what it should be and does not have any hidden functionality. For example, replacing the value of some pixels in a photo or a few characters in a string encoding an error message should not affect execution. However, if after doing so a dynamic class-loading action crashes or a network connection does not take place, it might be the case that the photo actually contained a piece of code or the string was instead a network address or URL. Our approach is similar to fuzzing 9 but focuses on the manipulation of a program's components rather than its inputs. Figure 1 shows Alterdroid's high-level architecture, which has two major components: fault injection and differential analysis.
The first component takes the candidate app package as input and generates a fault-injected one. It first extracts all app components and identifies those suspected of containing obfuscated functionalities. Such identification is carried out on an anomaly-detection basis by comparing certain statistical features of the component contents with a predefined model for each possible type of resourcecode, photos, video, text files, databases, and so on. It then injects faults into candidate components and repackages these together with the unaltered ones into a new app. This process admits simultaneous injection of different faults into different components and is driven by a search algorithm that attempts to identify where the obfuscated functionalities are hidden.
The differential-analysis component executes both the original and fault-injected apps under identical conditions (context and user inputs) and monitors and records their behavior, producing two activity signatures. Such signatures are sequential traces of the activities executed by the app, such as opening a network connection, sending or receiving data, loading a dynamic component, sending an SMS message, and interacting with the file system. Then, as in a string-to-string correction problem, it computes the Levenshtein (edit) distance between them to return the differential signature, this being a list of observable differences in terms of insertions, deletions, and substitutions. Finally, it analyzes the differential signature through a pattern-matching process driven by rules that relate different types of hidden functionalities with elements found in the signature.
Identifying components of interest
An app can be seen as a collection of components, each composed of numerous classes (code) as well as other resources accessed at runtime, such as asset files. Components have a type, including code, photo, video, database, and so on. We define a component of interest (CoI) as one that does not fit a model defined for all components of its type.
In the current version of Alterdroid, models measure statistical features, such as expected entropy, byte distribution, or average size. We also apply several heuristics based on the file type (indicated by the magic number) and its extension. Alterdroid computes these features from a dataset of components of the same type. For each model, there is a function that checks whether or not the component complies with its model. For example, if the model is a byte distribution, then the function could be a goodnessof-fit test (for example, chi-squared) between the model and the component's byte distribution. In our experience, such simple models suffice to spot the most commonand rather simple-obfuscation methods observed in smartphone malware, including code camouflaged as supplementary multimedia files, connection data hidden in text variables, and so on.
Generating fault-injected apps
Fault conditions can be injected into an app by altering one or more of its components. A fault-injection operator (FIO) creates a modified app by replacing a component with a slightly changed one. This may or may not translate into observable differences in the app's execution. FIOs that replace data components are particularly revealing, as obfuscated malware is especially hard to discover when hidden inside what seems to be only data. FIOs can also be applied to benign components to better understand their role within the app. Some generic FIOs treat components as a bit string and apply changes such as flipping a randomly chosen bit or replacing a portion of the component by another randomly chosen one from among the app's components. In addition, data type-specific operators can be useful to modify data objects (for example, multimedia files) while preserving a correct syntax when the focus is on changing the content without rendering the object unusable.
Alterdroid injects CoIs it has identified with faults and reassembles them, together with the remaining app components, to generate a mutated app. This process can generate several fault-injected apps, as there are multiple ways of applying different FIOs to different components in the set of CoIs. Alterdroid generates fault-injected apps one at a time and applies differential analysis. If it finds no evidence of malicious behavior in the differential analysis, it invokes the fault-injection process again to generate a different mutated app, and so on.
All FIOs in Alterdroid are indistinguishable, meaning that the fault-injected app should behave as the original one, provided that the altered component does not include any hidden functionality. This allows for a more efficient fault-injection process based on the fact that the composition of indistinguishable FIOs is an indistinguishable FIO. Consequently, if the same FIO is applied to multiple components and there is a hidden functionality in just one of them, the resulting app will behave exactly as if just the malicious component had been fault-injected. The overall fault-injection process, which is entwined with the differential-analysis process, is essentially a search algorithm that identifies all potentially malicious components.
Applying differential analysis
An app requests services through numerous available system calls. We can describe an app's behavior through the activities it executes. 10 In some cases there will be a one-to-one correspondence between an activity and a system call, while in others an activity encompasses a sequence of system calls executed in a given order. An app's execution flow could follow different paths depending on the user-provided inputs and the state of the environment when the execution takes place. Alterdroid summarizes the observable behavior resulting from the execution in an activity signature, this being an ordered time series given by the sequence of executed activities. A key task in Alterdroid is analyzing the behavioral differences between the original app and the slightly modified version of it after applying fault-injection operations. It carries this out by recording and analyzing the differences between the apps' activity signatures. Alterdroid handles this problem as one of string-to-string correction, in which differences are represented as the minimum number of edit operations-insertions, deletions, and substitutions-that transform one signature into another. This minimal sequence of operations constitutes the differential signature.
Alterdroid's analysis scheme deduces an app's properties from the presence or absence of certain patterns in the differential signature between the original and the faultinjected app. We illustrate this concept with three examples. Example 1. Assume that an app uses an image as an icon in its user interface. Modifying some pixels of such an icon, or even replacing it with another valid icon, should not affect the app's execution flow. However, if the modified app behaves differently from the original one under exactly the same conditions, we can deduce that the original icon contained some unexpected functionalities, such as a piece of compiled code masquerading as an icon.
Example 2.
Let v be a variable such that its content has no influence on the program flow. For example, v could be a string containing an error message to be displayed at some point. Such strings have been broadly used in existing malware to hide URLs pointing to servers from where the malware can download additional code, receive instructions, send data, and so on. To avoid detection, the string is often obfuscated, generally through a simple substitution scheme, and the URL is only revealed at execution time. Thus, any modification of the string resulting in a damaged URL will likely prevent the establishment of a connection.
Example 3. It could be possible to find out whether a component leaks information through various sensorsaccelerometer, GPS, and so on-if, after fault injection, the differential signature lacks access to such a sensor and a network connection.
PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
Our prototype Alterdroid implementation builds on numerous open source Android tools that facilitate tasks such as extracting components, repackaging them into an app, and analyzing dynamic behavior. Even though the current version does not have a comprehensive set of FIOs and differential-analysis rules, the system is easily extensible.
Alterdroid is implemented using generic Java and Python building blocks. The system extracts app components using androguard (https://code.google.com/p/androguard). It strongly types FIOs during their definition to avoid syntactic or unexpected errors in the course of the modified app's execution. For instance, an operator defined for a JPEG image can only inject faults into components of that type. After injecting a fault, Alterdroid repackages components into a modified app using android-apktool (https:// code.google.com/p/android-apktool).
Alterdroid uses Monkey (http://developer.android. com/tools/help/monkey.html) to generate a common sequence of events to interact with both the original and the fault-injected apps. Monkey supports five main classes of input events: activity launch, service launch, action buttons, screen touch, and text input. Alterdroid then executes each app in a controlled environment using the generated stream of events. This functionality is provided by DroidBox (https://code.google.com/p/droidbox), an application sandbox that also allows the system to monitor various features related to an app's execution during a fixed, usergiven amount of time.
To generate activity signatures, Alterdroid monitors the execution of 11 different events associated with the app:
• crypto: generated when the app invokes calls to the cryptographic API; • net open, net read, and net write: associated with network I/O activities-opening a connection, receiving data, and sending data, respectively; • file open, file read, and file write: associated with file system I/O activities-opening, reading, and writing a file, respectively; • sms: generated whenever the app sends or receives a text message; • call: generated whenever the app invokes a call or takes one from the device; • leak: generated whenever the app leaks private information, as determined by tainting analysis; 11 and • dex load: generated when the app loads native code.
Although the current Alterdoid implementation uses DroidBox to monitor the sandbox, our architecture allows use of other dynamic-analysis tools. For instance, if the target is malware that specializes in escaping from the sandbox, tools based on virtual introspection such as DroidScope 12 might then be used. More efficient leakagedetection tools can also be employed. 6 Similarly, the Alterdroid architecture is agnostic to the strategy used to explore app behavior. The current version's main goal is to intelligently drive GUI exploration to cover different functionalities. Thus, it does not aim to trigger contextual malware, whose detection is still a formidable challenge. 6 Although this feature remains out of the scope of this article, we believe that it will be instrumental in analyzing forthcoming malware and, therefore, we plan to incorporate it in future work.
Alterdroid incorporates a pattern-matching engine for analyzing differential signatures. The engine relies on a user-provided set of rules to seek patterns in the differential signatures. Such rules are fully customizable and allow security analysts to express complex properties through classical logical connectors such as AND, OR, NOT, and so on.
Finally, Alterdroid allows several simultaneous parallel executions due to the time required to execute a dynamic analysis. In fact, the time required to identify the CoIs and generate the FIOs is negligible compared to that required to stimulate and monitor the sandbox.
ALTERDROID IN PRACTICE: THREE CASE STUDIES
To illustrate how market operators and security analysts can use Alterdroid to help analyze complex obfuscated mobile malware, we present three case studies of malicious Android apps: DroidKungFu (DKF), AnserverBot (ASB), and GingerMaster (GM). These three representative samples incorporate obfuscation techniques of various degrees of sophistication as well as malicious features common in malware for smart devices 6 such as aggressive privilege escalation exploits, command-and-control (C&C)-like functions, and information leakage.
DroidKungFu
DKF's main goal is to collect certain details about an infected Android device, including the IMEI (International Mobile Station Equipment Identity) number, phone model, and OS version. It is mostly distributed through open or alternative markets via repackaging-that is, by piggybacking the malicious payload into various legitimate applications. Apps infected with DKF are distributed together with a root exploit hidden within the app's assets, namely, Rage Against the Cage (RAC). To hinder static analysis, this encrypted payload is only decrypted at runtime.
We fed one DKF variant to Alterdroid, which first extracted the variant's CoIs, injected various faults into these components, and then applied differential analysis by executing the resulting app and comparing it to the original. The sample contained about 170 resource files, including 153 PNG files, 6 MP3 files, 2 XML files, 1 DEX file, and an RSA key file. All of these assets were, in principle, suspected of containing obfuscated functionality. Figure 2a shows the differential behavior reported by Alterdroid over a two-minute period. Activities launched by the original piggybacked app correspond to the full plot, while the behavior after fault injection is indicated by the green (legitimate app) and black (DKF) squares. Alterdroid revealed that a text file pertaining to the assets was randomly modified. We later identified this file as the component containing the RAC exploit and found that disabling the malware's access to such functionality prevented it from establishing a network connection (net open, net write), leaking information through it (leak), and later performing some I/O operations (file read). This analysis agrees with previously reported results about DKF. 8 In the case of DKF, applying standalone static detection techniques was not sufficient to identify malicious payloads without human-driven inspection. This is due to the way that the malware obfuscates its core components. Specifically, each variant uses a different encryption key hidden throughout the code. Even when we attempted to apply standalone dynamic analysis, this technique only gave a rough notion of the app's holistic behavior. In fact, the behavior introduced by DKF is strongly entwined with the original code of the repackaged app such that some of its key activities, like network connections, might be easily seen as normal.
AnserverBot
The ASB specimen we analyzed is similar to the first versions of DKF in terms of sophistication and distribution strategy. 10 However, ASB introduces an update component that enables it to retrieve at runtime secondary payloads and the latest C&C URLs from public blogs. It also incorporates advanced anti-analysis methods to avoid detection: on one hand, ASB introduces an integrity component to check if the app has been modified, while on the other, it piggybacks the main payload in native runnable code. Furthermore, ASB obfuscates its internal classes and methods, and partitions the main payload in two different parts: while one is installed, the other is dynamically loaded without actually being installed. Specifically, ASB hides one of these components into the assets folder under the names anservera.db or anserverb.db. In addition, it inserts a new component named com.sec.android.provider.drm that executes a root exploit known as Asroot. 7 As in the case of DKF, we observed that all ASB variants contain a nonnegligible amount of candidate CoIs. The specimen we examined had about 78 resource files, including 54 image files, 1 database file, 1 DEX file, and a ZIP file. After a few iterations of the fault-injection process, Alterdroid positively identified the actual payload within the database file, as well as the behavior related to this component. More precisely, it triggered this CoI after observing a mismatch between the magic number of the file (APK) and the actual extension of the database. In fact, when a fault is injected into the database file, ASB's integrity check naturally aborts its execution and produces a result similar to that expected from the original app. Figure 2c shows the exhibited differential behavior over two minutes. ASB first establishes a network connection (net open, net write) after loading the main payload (file read, dex load). After that, it continues reading data that it finally leaks out. Interestingly, the legitimate app uses the network as well, although it does not leak any personal information.
GingerMaster
GM is the first known malware to use root exploits for privilege escalation on Android 2.3. Its main goal is to exfiltrate private information such as the device ID-IMEI number, MSI number, and so on-or the contact list stored in the phone. GM is generally repackaged with a root exploit known as GingerBreak, 7 which is stored as a PNG and JPEG asset file. Right after infecting the device, GM connects to the C&C server and fetches new payloads.
We analyzed a GM sample with around 60 asset resources, 30 of which were photos in different formats. Of those images, Alterdroid identified four as strongly suspicious. A detailed analysis later revealed that they were malformed PNGs that also contained several ASCII scripts. Alterdroid was also able to determine that such malformed image files play a key role in triggering the payloads piggybacked into the legitimate app, including the ASCII scripts. Figure 2b shows the differential behavior exhibited over a two-minute period when Alterdroid injected one such image with faults. GM started execution of a service that performs some I/O operations (file read, file write) before finally leaking private information through the network (net write, leak). Again, even when the malicious components were hidden, Alterdroid was able to differentiate them and help identify the underlying malicious behavior.
ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We tested Alterdroid against a dataset of around 300 malicious (obfuscated), grayware, 6 and goodware apps. Specifically, we tested about 200 variants of DKF, ASB, and GM obtained from the Android Malware Genome Project 8 and about 100 legitimate apps available from the Recognition of Android Malware Patterns (RAMP) Competition (http://fsktm.upm.edu.my/~alid/RAMP.htm). Every app was executed over a time span of two minutes; for reasons described below, the GM apps were also executed over 1,200 seconds (GM+). Table 1 summarizes the experimental results with respect to both differential-analysis performance and detection effectiveness; full reports and details are available at www.seg.inf.uc3m.es/~guillermo-suarez-tangil/ Alterdroid. Differential-analysis performance is measured as the time (overhead) taken by Alterdroid per app and fault-injection operation, including duration of the analysis. Detection effectiveness is given by the true positive ratethat is, the ratio between the number of correct positive matches and the total number of apps tested. False negatives correspond to apps that are supposed to match a rule, but Alterdroid fails to do so.
As for legitimate apps, during our evaluation we did not inspect every suspicious reported behavior. Instead, we labeled those apps that are presumably good but matched one or more rules as grayware and marked them for subsequent analysis. Recall that Alterdroid is more a tool for analysis than detection, as the chief goal is identifying obfuscated functionality and reporting it to the analyst. However, classifying hidden functionality as malicious or not is an entirely different problem that, in many cases, might depend on each user's privacy preferences.
One notable aspect of Alterdroid is that the dynamicanalysis process accounts for approximately half of the total time overhead. The remaining half is taken by DroidBox to set up and boot the sandbox. For example, analyzing the CoIs of an app and injecting four faults takes about 10 seconds, whereas starting up an Android 2.3 sandbox with 512 Mbytes of RAM takes about 160 seconds per fault-injection operation. These figures reveal that the performance of the entire differential-analysis process is strongly affected by the required preparations. This suggests a simple optimization strategy based on booting a pool of sandboxes and keeping them alive, rather than initializing them on demand.
The time required to extract a complete differential signature highly depends on the type of malware and the mechanisms it uses to trigger the malicious payload, as seen in GM and GM+. However, we observed that most specimens run their payloads promptly. Thus, brief monitoring is generally sufficient for a reliable evaluation.
Alterdroid's detection accuracy was very good, especially with respect to obfuscated malware (DKF, ASB, and GM). Accuracy dropped below 97 percent only in the case of GM, and this was corrected simply by giving more time to dynamic analysis (GM+). For instance, results for ASB showed an average number of 3.90 rules matching several differential signatures with suspicious behaviors, such as network or data leakage activity.
One challenge we faced when analyzing grayware was identifying whether some behaviors were malicious or not. Many legitimate apps are not fully malicious but carry out activities that may constitute a privacy risk for some users. Our analysis found that most such suspicious behaviors are related to the app's accessing local data and exfiltrating it over the network. We did not try to determine whether these were intrinsic behaviors caused by the fault-injection processfor example, because the app contained an integrity check similar to that in ASB. Nonetheless, indications that an app is behaving suspiciously warrant further analysis.
T raditional detection techniques cannot match the sophistication and obfuscation of current mobile malware, necessitating new approaches to protect users' devices. 2 Furthermore, the state of the art and current trends in mobile malware suggest that automated malware detection and analysis is critical to assessing application security.
Differential fault analysis, as implemented by Alterdroid, is a powerful and novel dynamic-analysis technique that can identify potentially malicious components within an app package. Alterdroid effectively complements staticanalysis tools that focus on inspecting code components and thus can overlook pieces of code hidden in data objects or simply obfuscated.
Alterdroid has been conceived as a general-purpose framework with a versatile architecture that can be extended in numerous ways, and we are currently developing an open source version of it. Furthermore, we are following up on preliminary experimental results showing that Alterdroid's effectiveness depends not on the duration of the dynamic analysis but on how "fast" the malicious conditions are triggered. Although current malware is extremely naïve in this regard, we believe that future specimens will be more resilient against this detection technique, requiring further efforts in contextual security. 6 We are also exploring optimal ways to select CoIs and to inject faults. 9 
